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ABSTRACT 
 
The use of Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I), Vehicle to 
Roadside Unit (V2R) and Vehicle to Other (V2X) communications are increasingly 
applied over existing and upcoming transportation means by the United States 
Department of Transportation (USDOT) and other federal agencies. From previous 
statistical data, these technologies would primarily avoid or mitigate vehicle crashes and 
would provide more safety, mobility and various other benefits on the roads (“Traffic 
Safety Facts 2012,” 2013; “Traffic Safety Facts 2013” 2014). During the communication 
processes between vehicles, infrastructures and roadside units’ various sensitive data 
such as positions and speed of the vehicles, are transmitted which are currently highly 
vulnerable. These facts are generated from this research experiment results performed on 
the provided data sets from the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute 
(UMTRI). An interference to the vehicular communications is possible by intentional or 
unintentional malicious users or other elements which puts drivers at greater risk with the 
upcoming vehicular technology. Moreover, different agencies and private companies are 
 
 
utilizing collected data from the USDOT to improve the operational volume of roads and 
services while avoiding accidents. They are also trying to provide other third-party 
Internet-based services to the consumers based on the live streaming information.  
This research paper gives a detailed description of all aspects of the vehicular 
communications protocol (i.e. DSRC, CA, 802.11p protocol, smart infrastructure, etc.). 
This research paper will provide details of all identified security features (i.e. encryption 
methods, certificate management, physical securities, data management lifecycles, etc.) 
that have been applied to these mechanisms to protect the safety of drivers (Cronin, 
2013). The USDOT has currently approved the implementation of a 5.9 GHz band, along 
with the 802.11p standard wireless protocol for dedicated short-range communications 
used in vehicular communication (Shankland, 2014). This research paper will also 
provide details of current standards and regulations which will be in effect for the 
upcoming vehicular technologies in the future in the US along with the susceptibilities to 
the interruptions of services.  
Finally, this research will utilize the actual data sets compiled using the actual 
safety pilot model deployment (SPMD) provided by the UMRTI researchers. The 
analysis of these results will validate that this protocol is susceptible to interference 
during communications. This will be shown by plotting the latitudinal and longitudinal 
coordinates and thus demonstrating the occurrence of gaps within communication (i.e. 
interference to the vehicular communication) in the existing SPMD prototype data sets. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Vehicular Technology 
Vehicular technology refers to wireless communications systems between two 
or more vehicles or vehicles to roadside infrastructures and others those are 
available in the streets regardless of their state of motion. In general, vehicles 
equipped with vehicle technology consists of equipment’s such as Vehicle On-
Board Unit (OBU) used in the vehicle, Road Side Unit (RSU) used over in the 
infrastructures at intersections, gas stations and safe communication channel used 
between transmission of data to the minimal level.  
Vehicular network utilizes the dedicated short-range communications (DSRC) 
devices, vehicular networks, certificate authority for handling quick secure 
transition between vehicles and infrastructure. The vehicular communications also 
include fast handling algorithms that use live-streaming data exchanged between 
vehicles and infrastructure elements to perform calculations. The transmitter 
presented in the OBU and RSU equipment would use the dedicated portion of 
wireless spectrum, new wireless standard 802.11p to authenticate each message 
(Faezipour, Mehrdad, Adnan, and Addepalli, 2012, pg. 90-100; Weimerskirch, 
n.d.) 
During the vehicular communication, different critical information of vehicles 
such as speed, acceleration and distance along with general information such as 
weather and traffic are being transmitted which assist the drivers in a timely 
manner (“2015 FHWA Vehicle to Infrastructure”2014). Based upon the 
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information gathered, sorted from different vehicles during the process, it 
recognizes high-risk situations ahead of time and produces driver alerts and 
warnings. This is also known as signal phase and timing (SPAT) information, 
which is one of the most important advantages of using vehicular technologies 
(Peter, Zsolt, Szilard, 2014, #ch-9). 
The effectiveness of such vehicular technologies is due to the reliability of 
wireless communication and transmission of vehicle data. The live data feeds 
from the vehicular communications at all times will initially assist drivers with the 
help of active safety features and can even engage in applying brakes or steering 
to avoid collision without the driver’s involvement in some cases. 
             
Figure1.1: An example demonstrating overall vehicular communication technology [20] 
 
The above figure shows a general architecture of how vehicular technology 
functions in a real world which has been presented by the wired insights for 
connected vehicles. It illustrates how connected vehicles would be able to 
communicate with each other and with smart infrastructures. This would 
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symbolize how the future road structure will look like with the presence of smart 
units in each vehicle which are capable of communicating with other vehicles and 
all smart technologies while secure vehicular communications take place. The 
following section further discusses in detail how each inter and intra vehicular 
communication takes place and all its necessary components which are listed as 
follow:   
 
1.2 Vehicle to Vehicle communications (V2V) 
Vehicle to Vehicle communications (V2V) refers to wireless communications 
between two or more vehicles, regardless of the state of motion. The upcoming 
vehicles would have smart on board units’ presence in each vehicle which are 
capable of communicating and sharing information with another vehicle. This 
exchange of information among vehicles are intended to improve better safety and 
decrease motor vehicle collisions (Peter, Zsolt, Szilard, 2014, #ch-9). 
 
1.3 Vehicle to Infrastructure communications (V2I) 
Vehicle to Infrastructure communications (V2I) refers to wireless 
communications between vehicles and the smart infrastructure, regardless of the 
state of motion. The smart infrastructure would include traffic light, and other 
infrastructures which are governmentally owned and operated. Also V2I requires 
cryptography operations to calculate over 200 digital signatures generated, and 
transmit over 1000 messages per second between the infrastructure and vehicle to 
efficiently perform its duty (Faezipour, Mehrdad, Adnan, and Addepalli, 2012, 
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pg. 90-100). It is estimated that V2I communications will help reduce additional 
12 percent of crashes which had not been addressed by V2V communications 
(Weimerskirch, n.d.).  
 
1.4 Vehicle to Roadside Unit(V2R) 
Vehicle to roadside unit communications (V2R) refers to wireless 
communications between vehicles and the roadside unit such as businesses via 
internet access. V2r would be differ from the V2I communications as the 
mechanism implemented could be privately owned and operated by local business 
and services. It is estimated that with the help of smart road side unit technology, 
this would not only reduce the number of road accidents, but also will help reduce 
travel speed while decreasing fuel consumption, making transportation more 
efficient. The RSU would act as a gateway to have all live traffic information 
provided to vehicle during the vehicular communication process. RSU would 
have paid services containing live feeds of info such as weather forecast, 
emergency vehicles notifications, parking information, and other businesses 
related to help people find nearest distance to stop the vehicle (Faezipour, 
Mehrdad, Adnan, and Addepalli, 2012, pg. 90-100). 
 
1.5 Vehicle to Others (V2X) [pedestrian, bicycle, etc.] 
Vehicle to Vehicle communications (V2X) refers to wireless communications 
between vehicles and pedestrian or bicycle, regardless of the state of motion. The 
live data feeds used during vehicle to other (V2X) communications at all times 
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will initially assist drivers with the help of active safety features and can even 
engage in applying brakes or steering to avoid collision without the driver’s 
involvement in some cases. 
 
1.6 Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) 
The DSRC is also considered as the heartbeat of this technology as it includes 
information such as geographic location, timestamp and speed which is being 
broadcasted at all-time (Peter, Zsolt, Szilard, 2014, #ch-9). Vehicular network 
utilizes the dedicated short-range communications (DSRC) devices which work in 
5.9 GHz band with bandwidth of 75MHz spectrum and approximate range of 
1000 meters (Harding, Powell, Yoon, Fikentscher, Doyle, Sade, Lukuc, Simons 
and Wang, 2014). 
 
1.7 Certificate Authority (CA)  
The vehicular technologies consist of Certificate Authority (CA) which 
generates cryptographic key which help vehicles to communicate over TLS to the 
RSU as it would mostly be connected at all-time (Peter, Zsolt, Szilard, 2014, #ch-
9; Weimerskirch, n.d.; “2015 FHWA Vehicle to Infrastructure”2014) 
 
1.8 Vehicular Networks 
The vehicular technology uses a variation of the 802.11p wireless network 
standards which are used in the laptops and mobile devices which would create 
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communications and share speed and position information among other vehicles 
in 10 times per second. 
 
Summary 
The research performed and data collected will define how USDOT, NHTSA, 
FHWA has been more focus on the safety based upon the number of fatalities and 
vehicle accidents each year rather than assuring security and privacy to US 
citizens. During vehicular communications processes between vehicles, 
infrastructures, road side units and others various sensitive data such as driver’s 
identification, positions and speed of the vehicles, are transmitted which makes 
people concern about their privacy along with safety issues. Moreover, different 
agencies and manufacturing companies are utilizing data collected by the 
department of transportation to improve the structural capacity of roads, services 
while avoiding accidents. They are trying to provide other third party internet 
based services to the consumers based on the live streaming information. This 
exchanges are intended to improve better safety and decrease motor vehicle 
collisions according to the USDOT (Peter, Zsolt, Szilard, 2014, #ch-9). This paper 
will provide overview of the current state of overall vehicular technology; its open 
issues and the necessary implementations for future as recommended for the US 
based implementation.  
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Research Question 
This research performed will provide detail analysis and study of results of issues 
listed below: 
1. Can we determine that the SPMD (Safety Pilot Deployment Model) protocol is 
susceptible to the interruption during V2I (vehicle to infrastructure) 
communication and thus verify our proposed objectives using the SPMD data 
sets?   
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CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Research primarily based on the past studies for vehicular communication 
technologies have focused more on the safety of human lives than the privacy and 
security of an individual her in the United States. There have been numerous cyber-
attacks and security breaches on businesses, financial institutions, and government’s IT 
systems almost every day with the increase in the advancement of information 
technology. The danger of cyber threats in vehicular communication technologies will as 
well certainly rise when vehicles are online at all time, to be connected with each other or 
to smart infrastructures. This project illustrates the necessity for providing better safety to 
drivers in the United States with the upcoming vehicular communications technologies. A 
brief description and previous research studies concerning different aspects of vehicular 
communication technologies are discussed as below: 
 
2.1 Vehicular communication prototypes 
There exist large volumes of research over the vehicle to vehicle (V2V), 
vehicle to infrastructure (V2I), vehicle to roadside unit (V2R), vehicle to others 
(V2X) such as pedestrians or bicycles, and other vehicular networking 
technologies. An increasing amount of innovative studies are being carried out 
about using upcoming smarter sensor and communication mediums over 
vehicular technologies in order to make the roads safer, cleaner with (Festag, 
Alban, Roberto, Long Le and Dirk, n.d.). According to “In Vehicle Network: 
Attacks, Vulnerabilities and Proposed Solutions” research paper, the recent 
approaches applied in the implementation of future vehicular communications by 
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the U.S Government implies approaching vehicle which require transmitting 
information are at risk and are susceptible to attacks (Carsten, Todd, Mark and 
Jeffrey, 2015).  
 
2.2 Smart Infrastructure architecture 
 The process of wireless exchange of critical safety data and active data 
between vehicles and the road’s smart infrastructures are known as Vehicle to 
Infrastructure communications. This exchange is intended to improve better safety 
and decrease motor vehicle collisions (Faezipour, Mehrdad, Adnan, and 
Addepalli, 2012, pg. 90-100). Many studies have proven that implementation of 
intra vehicular communications are improving.  The smart architecture would be 
design to handle, process and store large amounts of data containing personal 
identifiable information of individuals which is major challenge towards 
implementing mandatory regulation by the US federal government in the 
upcoming vehicular communications (“2015 FHWA Vehicle to 
Infrastructure”2014). 
 The 2015 FHWA Vehicle to Infrastructure deployment guidance and 
products document mentions “FHWA will develop materials needed to support 
deployment (e.g. guide tools and best practices); ensure that deployed services are 
geographically interoperable and ensure that deployed services are developed in 
accordance with the requirements in Part 940 of Title 23 within the Code of 
Federal Regulations (23 CFR 940) and other applicable regulations” (“2015 
FHWA Vehicle to Infrastructure”2014). With the continuous progression of 
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capability and complexity of vehicular technologies, security issues arise to both 
intra-vehicle and inter-vehicle systems evolving in our daily lives (Zheng, 
Wenchao Li, Gerard, Zhu, and Shankar, 2015). The research paper “Future Cars: 
Necessity for an Adaptive and Distributed Multiple Independent Levels of 
Security Architecture” describes how security must be treated holistically and the 
design be suitable for adaptability and must also provide multiple independent 
levels of security for each architecture (Camek, Christian, Alois, 2013, pg. 17-24).  
This research argues the upcoming vehicular communication technologies 
proposed in the United States would have security challenges, privacy concerns 
along with safety issue for protecting more human lives (Camek, Christian, Alois, 
2013, pg. 17-24; Zeman, 2015; “2015 FHWA Vehicle,” 2014). Some studies have 
delineated the following aspects:    
 
2.3 Security challenges in overall design 
With the evolving smart infrastructure in place by the US government for 
gathering experimental data and also while trying to mandate it as regulation, 
upcoming vehicular technologies rises a lot of security challenges as debated by 
numerous scholar’s research papers. It has been shown from research records that 
most manufacturing industries producing vehicles with vehicular products lack 
appropriate security measures to protect against sophisticated hackers (Zeman, 
2015). “The Security Certificate Management System (SCMS) is a critical 
component of the CV environment designed to protect the security of the BSM 
data exchanged by vehicles and between vehicles and infrastructure” (“2015 
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FHWA Vehicle to Infrastructure”2014). Multiple research papers and 
experiments have proven the lack of adequate security measures by the US 
Government to the upcoming vehicular technology which will threaten the 
confidentiality and safety of all citizens, while trying to mandate these measures 
as law to provide safety.  As discussed by few research papers, the advancement 
in the security policy by the USDOT & FWHA must ensure the minimum 
requirements and limitations on the use of DSRC broadcasted information by 
police or DMV, and must clearly outline the revocation and re-installation 
procedure of DSRC unit to identify any made-up revocation for wrong operation 
(Weimerskirch, n.d.). One of the recommendations delivered by a research study 
for reliability of expected packets sent through the smart infrastructure was to 
implement the level of trustworthiness for DSRC unit that could display the 
applied level of physical security (Weimerskirch, n.d.). 
 
2.4 Automobile safety issue 
According to the research performed in the town of Ann Arbor, Michigan, by 
the University of Michigan and NHTSA, it was found that the vehicular 
technology could prevent more than half a million accidents and more than a 
thousand fatalities in the United States every year (Shankland, 2014). These 
experiments were performed using over 3000 cars equipped with vehicular 
communications devices to evaluate the overall significance of the vehicular 
networking technology (Shankland, 2014). Also it has been reported by the 
NHTSA that the number of people who died in roadway crashes decreased from 
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33,561 on 2012 to 32,719 on 2013; a 3.1 percent decrease in roadway crash 
fatalities (“Traffic Safety Facts 2012”, 2013; “Traffic Safety Facts 2013”, 2014). 
The NHTSA also reported the number of people injured in 2013 due to vehicular 
collisions was 2.31 million, 2.1 percent less than in 2012 (Markey, Blumenthal, 
2015). On average, the U.S highways experience approximately 43,0000 fatalities 
per year more than 14,000 crashes per day (Faezipour, Mehrdad, Adnan, and 
Addepalli, 2012, pg. 90-100). This information demonstrate how the US based 
research are focused more towards safety rather than providing more privacy and 
security to an individuals and several research papers have agreed upon these 
testimonials (Graig, 2014; Heijden, 2010; “Traffic Safety Facts 2012”, 2013; 
Weimerskirch, n.d.). 
 
2.5 Data management life cycle 
Research primarily based on a draft of deployment guidance and products 
have revealed that the FHWA, NHTSA and USDOT do not have any applicable 
policies or procedures for the overall data management processes (“2015 FHWA 
Vehicle to Infrastructure”2014). “In general, Federal law does not assign 
ownership, access, and use limitation to broadcast data. As a result, the US.DOT 
and FHWA do not currently have a specific policy assigning data ownership or 
limiting access to BSM data” (“2015 FHWA Vehicle to Infrastructure”2014). The 
U.S. department of transportation and the Federal Highway Administration must 
ensure strong security and enforce well-structured policies for each step during 
the entire data management life cycle.  
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2.6 U.S. Federal Government proposed guidance and recently 
proposed bill 
 “Connected Vehicle Environments (CVE) are systems comprised of 
hardware, software, and firmware that allow for the dynamic transfer of data 
between vehicles and between vehicles and the infrastructure including, at a 
minimum, Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment (WAVE) messages defined 
in Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) J2735 that are broadcast on Dedicated 
Short Range Communications (DSRC)” (“2015 FHWA Vehicle to 
Infrastructure”2014). The USDOT has currently approved to implement a 5.9 
GHz band, along with a 802.11p standard for vehicular technologies dedicated 
short range communications (Shankland, 2014). The USDOT currently has a 
well-defined and stable design to deploy the vehicular technology application but 
must try to resolve most of the open concerns such as geo-networking, 
misbehavior detection, physical security and security controllers, bootstrapping 
and security policies that has been discovered by some of the research studies 
(Weimerskirch, n.d.). 
Multiple scholars of evolving vehicular technologies have stated that the 
implementation of US Government policies and technical implementation would 
jeopardize the security and privacy of any individuals using such technology. 
Thus a current bill has been purposed by Senators Markey and Blumenthal cited 
as the “Security and Privacy in your Car Act of 2015” or the “SPY Car Act of 
2015” in order to protect U.S. citizens from security and privacy threats to their 
motor vehicles and for other purposes (Markey, Blumenthal, 2015). A copy of 
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SPY Car 2015 Act has been reference to Appendix D of this document. This 
would reveal how the US government has started a process to re-identify critical 
and key issues to provide better safety to all citizens while providing safety by 
having reduced accidents with the vehicular technology.  
Research studies have led the United States government to implement such 
techniques into transportation development projects for better safety of its citizen 
while on roads. The US Federal Highway Administration has proposed a mandate 
to take effect by 2020 in order to prevent human life loss in road accidents (Graig, 
2014). This would allow USDOT and other transportation agencies to accomplish 
additional research, which would tighten up the security features of applications 
and also have strong standards implemented by then. The US based project 
focuses on V2V safety, communication security, and single hop V2I 
communication to load security credentials (Weimerskirch, n.d.). 
Summary  
There have been several studies completed that support the safety of drivers 
but few have only concentrated on the security of the vehicular communication 
devices which will be used by drivers. Different groups of vehicles are developed 
for different developmental regions based upon geographical locations and will 
have differences with the mechanism, spectrum and software collaboration. These 
protocols have proven to be much more efficient, reliable and convenient while 
providing safer environments for all drivers while on the road. But it is crucial for 
all nations to have comparably standard implementations and procedure to 
provide additional safety, and security of drivers with the upcoming vehicular 
technologies.  
15 
 
 These studies validate how providing more safety of drivers within the US by 
various unauthorized users, substances and agent are becoming major challenges 
towards upgrading to support the vehicular technologies.  
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CHAPTER 3 ARCHITECTURE OF VEHICULAR 
TECHNOLOGIES 
3.1  Vehicular technology overall structure  
 The vehicle communication systems are made up of hardware, 
software, wireless protocols, and firmware which allows means of transportation 
to get interconnected to be able to transfer data with other vehicles and 
infrastructure. According to the IEEE Vehicular Technology Magazine, guest 
editors have described the upcoming automobile as “Vehicle are no longer a piece 
of the mechanical machine but a system of computerized and highly sophisticated 
electronic devices with hundreds of sensors embedded with and all over them” 
(Zhuang, Jamalipour, Bai, Vinel, 2015). Below figure 3.1 show the overall 
structure and vision of vehicular technologies by different nations including the 
United States, the European nations, and others.    
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Figure 3.1:  Overall structure of Vehicular technologies 
 In general, vehicular communication technologies consist of 
equipment’s and components such as vehicle On-Board Unit (OBU), Basic Safety 
Message (BSM), Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) protocol, 
Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment (WAVE) protocol, Road Side Unit 
(RSU) protocol, Certificate Authority (CA) and Security Certificate Management 
System (SCMS) mechanisms.  
 
Figure 3.2:  Structural design in a vehicle equipped with vehicular technology 
(“2015 FHWA Vehicle to Infrastructure”2014) 
 
 These protocols are being utilized for secure channel communication 
purposes between vehicles, infrastructures, and others to improve road traffic 
safety through various smart interactive mediums. The figure 3.2 shown below 
shows how the On board unit prototype looks and functions in a vehicle.  The 
OBU will be able to deliver various useful information to the vehicle not only to 
avoid any sort of collisions but also improve the road efficiency and safety by 
integrating wireless communications and informatics technology.  
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Figure 3.3: On Board Unit prototype (“What’s Next V2V”, 2014) 
Above figure 3.3 shows a general structure of how the on board units’ 
functions in a real world. Figure3 demonstrates a complete view of overall on 
board unit in a vehicle providing live feed information regarding safety to the 
driver of the vehicle. The live data feeds from vehicular communications at all 
times will assist drivers with active safety features and can even engage in 
applying brakes or steering to avoid the collision without the driver’s involvement 
in some cases.  
The other different components which are essentials for vehicular 
communications technologies are discussed as follow:  
 
  3.1.1 Wireless Network Prototype 
 The vehicular technology uses a variation of the 802.11 wireless 
network standards as the core communications standard which are 
consumed in the laptops and mobile device to establish efficient 
communication regarding speed and  position information among other 
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vehicles in 10 times per second. Vehicular network consumes the 
dedicated short-range communications devices which work in 5.9GHz 
band with bandwidth of 75MHz spectrum and approximate range of 1000 
meters (Harding, Powell, Yoon, Fikentscher, Doyle, Sade, Lukuc, Simons 
and Wang, 2014). The DSRC is also considered as the heartbeat of this 
technology as it includes information such as geographic location, 
timestamp, and speed which is broadcasted at all-time (Weimerskirch, 
n.d.). The transmitter presented in the OBU and RSU equipment would 
use the dedicated portion of the wireless spectrum, new wireless standard 
802.11p to authenticate each message (Weimerskirch, n.d.; “2015 FHWA 
Vehicle to Infrastructure”2014) 
 
  3.1.2 Cryptography Algorithm 
  Vehicular technologies utilize an incorporated cryptography 
algorithm to communicate efficiently and securely among vehicles and 
smart infrastructures. All calculations that could identify a collision or risk 
situation on the road would be transmitted in seconds to all vehicles in 
advance thus providing maximum safety of an individuals. Thus, the best 
advantages of such communications are the signal phase and timing 
(SPAT) information which transmits safety advisories and a warning to 
drivers among vehicle via other vehicles or infrastructure (Peter, Zsolt, 
Szilard, 2014, #ch-9). The vehicular technologies also consist of 
Certificate Authority (CA) which generates the cryptographic key and 
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communicates over TLS to the RSU as it would always be connected at 
all-time (Peter, Zsolt, Szilard, 2014, #ch-9; Weimerskirch, n.d.; “2015 
FHWA Vehicle to Infrastructure”2014). The most important role of TLS 
protocol would be to ensure that no eavesdrop or tampering of devices 
takes place during any communication processes between two vehicles or 
vehicles to infrastructure thus providing complete assurance of security in 
vehicular technologies.  The RSU would act as a gateway having all live 
traffic information provided to vehicle during the vehicular 
communication process. RSU would also have paid services containing 
live feeds of info such as weather forecast, emergency vehicles 
notifications, parking information, and other businesses related to helping 
people find the nearest distance to stop the vehicle (Weimerskirch, n.d.). 
 
  3.1.3 SCMS Manager 
   It stands for Security Credential Management Systems, and its 
purpose is to provide secure system design to the vehicular 
communication technologies by verifying authentic messages that are 
being transmitted between vehicles or the smart infrastructures. “The 
SCMS encompasses all technical, organizational, and operational aspects 
of the V2V security system that is needed to support trusted, safe/secure 
V2V communications and to protect driver privacy appropriately. The 
primary managerial component of the envisioned SCMS (called the SCMS 
Manager) would be responsible for managing all other component entities 
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(called Certificate Management Entities or CMEs) which support the 
different V2V security functions that, together ensure the operational 
integrity of the total system.” (“Vehicle-to-Vehicle Security”, 2014) It 
would also mitigate attacks or identify misbehavior during the vehicle 
communication to protect against attacks so as to ensure the privacy of all 
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Figure 3.4: Overview of SCMS structure (“V2V Communication 
Security”, 2014) 
The figure 3.4 shown above shows how SCMS Manager works and 
functions in the overall structure to ensure better safety and privacy of 
drivers during vehicular communications. The figure demonstrates a 
complete view of overall technical and operational aspects of SCMS 
Manager.  
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The following sections further discussed in detail about how vehicle-to-
vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), vehicle-to-roadside unit 
(V2R), and vehicle-to-other (V2X) structure regarding functionality, 
components required and how each structure differentiate among one 
another:  
 
3.2  Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) 
        
Figure 3.5: Vehicle to Vehicle communication structure (ZTE Corporation, n.d.)  
Above figure 3.5 shows a general structure of how Vehicle to Vehicle 
functions in a real world. The figure demonstrates how one vehicle communicates 
to other vehicles and also to the smart Infrastructures thus sharing various types of 
information and data essentials to aware all roads conditions among each other. 
From the figure shown above, we can also agree that Vehicular communication 
technologies are similar to that of mobile cellular networks but are specifically 
23 
 
developed for vehicle mobility to have better efficiency and safety of all 
individuals on the road.  
 
3.3  Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) 
 
 
Figure 3.6: An example demonstrating Structural design of V2I systems (Camek, 
Christian, Alois, 2013, pg. 17-24) 
 
Above figure 3.6 shows a general architecture of how V2I systems functions 
which was presented by the ITS Joint Program Office, USDOT (Camek, 
Christian, Alois, 2013, pg. 17-24). The figure demonstrates how antenna located 
on OBU connects using DSRC to the antenna of RSU during V2Icommunications 
process. It too illustrates how the RSU processor connects to the router of the 
infrastructure would then have the IPv6 network connection, have Certificate 
Authority over the Centers to distribute the gathered information. It has been 
similarly cited in research papers that RSU would help prioritize messages to be 
shown based on the criticality of the messages (Peter, Zsolt, Szilard, 2014, #ch-9; 
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Harding, Powell, Yoon, Fikentscher, Doyle, Sade, Lukuc, Simons and Wang, 
2014; Markey, Blumenthal, 2015). RSU would act as a gateway having all live 
traffic information provided to the vehicle during the V2I communication process. 
RSU would also have paid services containing live feeds of info such as weather 
forecast, emergency vehicles notifications, parking information, and other 
businesses related to helping people find the nearest distance to stop the vehicle 
(Weimerskirch, n.d.). 
3.4  Vehicle to Others (V2X) 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Vehicle to other communication structure [23] 
Above figure 3.7 shows a general structure of how Vehicle to Others 
functions in a real world. The figure demonstrates a complete view of overall 
vehicular communications among multiple vehicle, infrastructure, and 
pedestrians. The figure shows how pedestrians would be obstacles for vehicle, 
and the vehicle could avoid the collision by getting the notification ahead of time.   
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CHAPTER 4 EFFECTS OF VEHICULAR 
TECHNOLOGIES 
On average, the U.S highways experience more than five million vehicle crashes 
every year which includes approximately more than 30, 000 fatalities (“2015 FHWA 
Vehicle to Infrastructure”2014). The report presented by the NHTSA has found that 
32,675 people killed in roadway crashes during 2014 which is 25 percent less than the 
year 2005 in which 43,443 people were dead (“Traffic Safety Facts 2012”, 2013; “Traffic 
Safety Facts 2013”, 2014). The NHTSA has also reported the number of people that were 
injured in 2014 to be 2.3 million which is 13 percent less than in 2005, which shows 2.69 
million of people injured due to vehicle collisions (“Traffic Safety Facts 2013”, 2014). 
The data gathered by the NHTSA from 2005 to 2014 in the crash records finding are 
shown in the table below: 
TABLE 4.1: Crash Reports findings presented by NHTSA from 2005 to 2014 
(“Traffic Safety Facts 2012”, 2013; “Traffic Safety Facts 2013”, 2014) 
Year Number of Fatalities Fatalities Rate Number of injured people 
(million) 
2014 32,675 3.2 2.3 
2013 32,719 3.2 2.31 
2012 33,782 3.3 2.36 
2011 32,367 3.2 2.21 
2010 32,885 3.2 2.23 
2009 33,808 3.3 2.22 
2008 37,423 3.7 2.34 
2007 41,059 4.1 2.49 
2006 42,642 4.2 2.57 
2005 43,443 4.3 2.69 
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Figure 4.1: Fatalities and Fatality Rate per 100 million Vehicle Miles Traveled 
by Year 
Figure 4.1 shows a graph of the number of people who died in motor vehicle 
traffic crashes in the United States from 2005 to 2014.  It has been projected that with the 
help of vehicular technologies, this would not only reduce the number of road accidents 
but also will assist in reducing travel speed while decreasing fuel consumption, and 
making transportation more efficient. The US Federal Highway Administration has 
proposed a mandate to take effect in the mid-2020s to prevent human life loss in road 
accidents (Graig, 2014). The upcoming new era connected vehicular technologies would 
consist of safety feature, and also the security concerns. The connected vehicles would be 
an improvement toward increased safety of human lives but would also concerns the 
security of all drivers.  
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The following sections further discusses in detail how both positive and negative 
aspects perform a significant role to the upcoming vehicular technologies which are listed 
as follow: 
4.1 Improvement to the automobile safety 
          An experiment was performed between 2012 and 2014 by researchers at the 
University of Michigan in collaboration with the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA). During the experiment nearly 3000 cars were equipped 
with experimental vehicular communication technologies to study the 
communications records of those vehicles. Based on the reduced number of accidents 
and fatalities, reported by the University of Michigan, NHTSA concluded that the 
new vehicular technology could prevent more than half of the total accidents that 
occurs every year within US (Weimerskirch, n.d.). Also, NHTSA concluded that the 
upcoming vehicular technology would revolutionize the entire transportation industry 
by preventing thousands of fatalities thus would want to ultimately mandate the use 
of vehicular technology for safety purposes in the future (Harding, Powell, Yoon, 
Fikentscher, Doyle, Sade, Lukuc, Simons and Wang, 2014; “Traffic Safety Facts 
2012”, 2013; “Traffic Safety Facts 2013”, 2014; Weimerskirch, n.d). The experiment 
performed also evaluates the overall significance of the   upcoming vehicular 
networking technology.   
 The 2015 FHWA Vehicle to Infrastructure deployment guidance and products 
document does mention clearly in its report that “FHWA will develop materials 
needed to support deployment (e.g. guide tools and best practices); ensure that 
deployed services are geographically interoperable and ensure that deployed services 
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are developed in accordance with the requirements in Part 940 of Title 23 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations (23 CFR 940) and other applicable regulations.” (Zeman, 
2015). It is similarly stated in most of the research paper that vehicular technologies 
will be able to take benefit of existing and evolving vehicular technologies services 
which are additional features or an upgrade to current vehicular technologies (“2015 
FHWA Vehicle to Infrastructure”2014).  
 
4.2 Securities threats 
The protocols that have are voted for the current intra-vehicular technologies 
will not provide adequate security to protect against intentional and unintentional 
threats. There have been numerous cyber-attacks and security breaches on businesses, 
financial institutions, and government’s IT systems almost every day with the 
increase in the advancement of information technology. The danger of cyber threats 
in vehicular communications technologies will as well, without doubt, rise when 
vehicles are online at all time to connect with each other’s or the smart 
infrastructures. 
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CHAPTER 5 DETERMINING THE INTERRUPTION OF 
SERVICES   
 In this chapter, we will explore weaknesses of upcoming vehicular technologies 
protocol based upon the Safety Pilot Model Deployment (SPMD) Research/experiment 
data. The research data was obtained from https://www.its-rde.net/home website as 
suggested by Walton Fehr, the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology | ITS 
Joint Program Office in the US Department of Transportation (USDOT).  
5.1  Experimental Setup 
 5.1.1 Safety Pilot Model Data (SPMD) data set 
 The SPMD is a complete data collection effort by the researchers 
at the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute (UTMRI) 
involved with other different research entities to test the vehicular 
communication devices under the real world condition (United State 
Department of Transportation, 2012; Basic Safety Message, 2016). Based 
on the facts provided in the UMTRI website, the federal agencies 
supporting the project are the USDOT, National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA), Research and Innovative Technology 
Administration (RITA), Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and Federal 
Transit Administration(FTA) (United State Department of Transportation, 
2012; Basic Safety Message, 2016). During this experiment nearly 3000 
vehicles which includes cars, truck and transit buses were equipped with 
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experimental vehicular communication technologies to analyze the 
communications records between vehicles (United State Department of 
Transportation, 2012; Basic Safety Message, 2016). The entire purpose of 
this experiment was to demonstrate how vehicular technologies would 
operate in a real environment by evaluating the interoperability of 
Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) and also the possibility, 
scalability and security of the protocol devices. 
 
 5.1.2 Actual SPMD experimental setup and device utilized 
 There were three safety pilot devices installed in multiple vehicles to 
perform vehicular communication during the actual experiment at Ann Arbor 
[27]. The list is as follow: 
a. Vehicle Awareness Device(VAD) 
b. Aftermarket Safety Device(ASD) 
c. ASD+ Data Acquisition System (DAS) 
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re 5.1.2: Images and description of actual Safety Pilot Devices (United State Department 
of Transportation, 2012). 
 Above figure 5.1.2 shows the actual devices image with detail 
description provided by the UMTRI safety pilot website. 
 There were also approximately 27-30 Roadside Equipment (RSE) 
units that were installed around University area in Ann Arbor for the 
research purposes. The actual document provides information on how the 
devices installed includes twenty-one signalized intersections, three curve 
locations, and five freeway locations. 
TABLE 5.1.2: Detail Description of all RSE units used during actual experiment 
[27] [28] 
RxDevice SpId Manufacturer Location Latitude Longitude RseCategory RSEID 
18001 127 Savari Fuller-Glen 42.28537 -83.7354 Signal 127 
18002 126 Savari Fuller-Maiden 42.28647 -83.73249 Signal 0126-A 
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Lane 
18003 170 Savari 
Fuller-Cedar 
Bend 42.28714 -83.72381 Signal 170 
18004 171 Savari 
Fuller-
Bonisteel Blvd 42.29032 -83.71918 Signal/Csw 0171-A 
18005 194 Savari 
Fuller-Glazier 
Way 42.28595 -83.711 Signal 194 
18006 173 Savari Fuller Court 42.28363 -83.7111 Signal 173 
18007 175 Savari 
Fuller-Huron 
High Drive 42.2808 -83.70635 Signal 175 
18008 94 Savari Fuller-Geddes 42.2776 -83.699 Signal 94 
18009 153 Arada Main-Depot 42.28914 -83.7473 Signal 153 
18010 76 Savari 
Plymouth-
Barton 42.29635 -83.7307 Signal 76 
18011 192 Savari 
Plymouth-
Murfin Ave 42.29155 -83.71911 Signal 192 
18012 159 Savari 
Plymouth-
Traverwood 
Dr. 42.30206 -83.71213 Signal 159 
18013 157 Savari 
Plymouth-
Nixon Rd 42.30247 -83.70724 Signal 157 
18014 81 Savari 
Plymouth-
Huron Pkwy 42.30258 -83.7043 Signal 81 
18015 86 Savari 
Plymouth-
Green 42.30489 -83.6926 Signal 0086-A 
18016 137 Savari 
Washtenaw-
Huron Pkwy 42.25653 -83.6954 Signal 137 
18017 15 Savari 
Washtenaw-
Pittsfield Blvd 42.25589 -83.69065 Signal 15 
18018 16 Savari 
Washtenaw-
Yost Blvd 42.25517 -83.68771 Signal 16 
18019 38 Savari 
Washtenaw-
US23 Ramp 42.2552 -83.68635 Signal 38 
18020 191 Savari 
Plymouth-
Pointe West 42.29823 -83.72196 Csw 191 
18021 190 Savari 
Plymouth-
Pointe East 42.29905 -83.7267 Csw 190 
18022 100 Savari 
Plymouth-
Murfin Ave 42.29155 -83.71911 Signal 100 
18024 193 Savari 
Fuller-Glazier 
Way West 42.28744 -83.71449 Csw 193 
18025 172 Savari 
Fuller-Glazier 
Way East 42.286 -83.71102 Csw 0172-A 
18026 862 Savari 
Plymouth-
Green 42.30489 -83.6926 Signal 0186-B 
18027 1712 Savari Fuller- 42.29032 -83.71918 Signal/Csw 0171-B 
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Bonisteel Blvd 
18028 1722 Savari 
Fuller-Glazier 
Way East 42.286 -83.71102 Csw 0172-B 
18029 1262 Savari 
Fuller-Maiden 
Lane 42.28647 -83.73249 Signal 0126-B 
18031 207 Arada UMTRI 42.298 -83.7032 Other 207 
18032 202 Savari 
Whl Maint. 
Center 42.2264 -83.7178 Other 202 
 
 5.1.3 SPMD overall structure 
 Below figure 5.1.3 shows the overall structure of the Safety Pilot 
Deployment Data and the data sets collected based on each functionality. 
“The SPMD data environment contains sanitized mobility data elements 
that were collected from nearly 3000 vehicles, equipped with connected 
vehicle technologies, traversing the Ann Arbor, MI transportation 
network. Data collected from Roadside Equipment installed at multiple 
locations along the transportation networks are included (United State 
Department of Transportation, 2012; Basic Safety Message, 2016). The 
data in this data environment was collected during two separate months, 
October 2012 and April 2013” (Basic Safety Message, 2016). 
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Figure 5.1.3:  Overall structure of Safety Pilot Deployment Data (Basic Safety 
Message, 2016). 
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 5.1.4 Actual Experiments Data Set 
  The genuine data sets that were gathered from the original 
experiments comprises of millions of individual data collected which are 
over 100 GB presented in multiple .csv files which are available on the 
USDOT Federal Highway Administration’s Research Data Exchange 
website (https://www.its-rde.net/home). The data sets accumulate of Basic 
Safety Message, Data Acquisition Systems 1, Data Acquisition Systems 2, 
Network, Roadside Equipment, and Weather data (Basic Safety Message, 
2016). The primary goal of the field test data to be available to the public 
is for demonstration the actual experiment while also allowing the users to 
implement queries, an algorithm for better Data Warehousing purposes.   
 
 5.1.5 SPMD Samples Data Analysis 
  For my thesis experiment purposes, I did utilize the SPMD-one-
day sample and SPMD- multi-days sample as per suggestion by Walt Fehr 
from the USDOT. Each of the BSM data units contains the latitude, 
longitude, and elevation of the vehicle and a temporary identifier as the 
data unit was transmitted to the road side units (Basic Safety Message, 
2016). The Roadside Equipment (RSE) Data Set (BSM) subsets of data 
that is mainly being utilized over this experiment is:  
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1. Roadside Equipment (RSE) Data Set (BSM)  
 It contains all of those data units received at the 27 equipped 
intersections. The experiments also contains eight .csv files of one-day 
sample and thirty-two .csv for multi-day sample which were obtained 
from the (https://www.its-rde.net) website. 
  A small batch of data from both one-day and multi-days’ sample 
were utilized to analyze the complete the SPMD data sets assessment 
experiment. Python program referenced in Appendix A is written to 
collaborate all .csv files and write it into a single database (MongoDB) for 
easier sorting and analyzes. Once the database was created, then it was 
converted to JSON file format. Another python program referenced in 
Appendix B is written to visualize the JSON file format which would 
specify and visualize multiple maps including Geolocation points 
consisting Latitude, and Longitude is plotted into a single map using 
Google Maps. 
 
5.2  Result Analysis 
 The primary goals for utilizing these data sets over this experiment was 
to plot sampled points of the data units transmitted within radio range of the 
intersection in the second set into a map. We sampled multiple devices sets 
containing both latitude and longitude data sets while utilizing the code 
referenced in Appendix B to verify the gap communication. The map is 
referenced in Appendix C of this document. The places where data exchange 
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between vehicle and transmitter does not occur verifies the interference to the 
vehicular communication presented in the SPMD protocol. The causes for the gap 
in communication are beyond the scope of this experiment and is subject to future 
work.  
The short description of the data sets used in my experiments are defined as 
follow: 
RxDevice is the ID number of the device that logs the Basic Safety Message 
(BSM). 
BSMID is the ID number that is transmitted from an equipped vehicle.   
TemporaryId is the temporary 4-byte random device identifier provided to give 
anonymity of vehicle. The life span of these identity remains for 5 minutes only 
DSeconds is the time taken between the data transmission between the vehicle 
and roadside units. 
Latitude is the geographical latitude of the vehicle which is represented as 32 but 
value 
Longitude is the geographical longitude of the vehicle which is represented as 32 
but value  
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CHAPTER 6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1  General Conclusions 
 The USDOT has currently approved the implementation of a 5.9 GHz 
band, along with 802.11p standard for V2V, V2I, V2R and V2X dedicated short 
range communications (Shankland, 2014). USDOT currently has a well-defined 
and established design to deploy the vehicular technology application but must try 
to resolve most of the open concerns such as geo-networking, misbehavior 
detection, physical security and safety controller, bootstrapping and security 
policies that have been discovered by some of the research studies (Weimerskirch, 
n.d.). The National Telecommunications and Information Administrator and 
Federal Communications Commission must guarantee that no unlicensed device 
be able to interfere with the Vehicle to Roadside Unit operations as unauthorized 
access over these mechanisms could potentially cause significant human 
destruction.  
  
Two Major Contributions during my thesis research project are listed as below: 
1. The detection of gaps in the SPMD data sets provided by the USDOT 
2. The methodology used for analyzing the large data set for V2I communication  
 
6.2 Answers to Research Questions  
 In Chapter 1 the problem statements were presented together with the 
research questions. After the detail analysis and thesis research performed below 
are the answered based upon the findings to the research questions. 
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1.  Can we determine that the SPMD (Safety Pilot Deployment Model) protocol 
is susceptible to the interruptions during V2I (vehicle to infrastructure) 
communication and thus verify our proposed objectives using the SPMD data 
sets? 
 As discussed in sections 5.1 and 5.2 of this research paper, the maps 
representing the SPMD data sets clearly show the gaps in the communication 
when occurred between vehicles and roadside units.   
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CHAPTER 7 FUTURE WORK 
7.1 Significant of the gaps between V2I communication 
 More data from the actual experiment done at Ann Arbor by UMTRI can 
be utilized to analyze the significance of the gaps between the communication in 
the Safety Pilot Model Deployment protocol. Advance technology and 
methodology might be utilized in future to identify whether the significant of gaps 
are caused due any available hotspot in the region or other factors.  
 
7.2 Identify the causes of gaps 
 Acquiring any of the SPMD protocols products to analyze actual V2I 
communication data would take the research to the next level. Further detail 
analysis for the significant of the gaps in communication could then lead in the 
detection of the intentional and unintentional attack causing the gap in 
communication. So, moving forward if a real experiment with cars that have 
SPMD protocol for V2I communication can be used to find the main causes of the 
gaps between the communication. That way any other exposures presented in the 
protocol could be identified and resolved ahead of time.  
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import fnmatch 
import os 
import csv 
from collections import OrderedDict 
from pymongo import MongoClient 
from geopy.geocoders import Nominatim 
import googlemaps 
 
def initDatabase(): 
    mongo_url = 'localhost:27017' 
    databaseClient = MongoClient(mongo_url) 
    return databaseClient 
 
def setupCollections(): 
    databaseClient = initDatabase() 
    SPMD = databaseClient['SPMD'] 
    return SPMD 
 
def reverseGeo(latitude, longitude): 
    latlon = latitude + ',' +longitude 
    geolocator = Nominatim() 
    location = geolocator.reverse(latlon) 
    return location.address 
 
def get_files_list(): 
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    csv_files = [] 
    for file in os.listdir("."): 
        if fnmatch.fnmatch(file, '*.csv'): 
            csv_files.append(os.path.abspath(file)) 
            #print(os.path.abspath(file)) 
    return csv_files 
 
def csv_reader(csvfile): 
    rows_list = [] 
 
    with open(csvfile, 'r') as csvread: 
        print("[+] Reading CSV File {}".format(csvfile)) 
        csvreader = csv.reader(csvread, delimiter=',', quotechar='|') 
        next(csvreader, None)  # skip the headers 
        for row in csvreader: 
            # Rows from a CSV FIle 
            required_data = OrderedDict([ 
                                                ('RxDevice', row[0]), 
                                                ('BSMID',row[1]), 
                                                ('TemporaryId', row[4]), 
                                                ('DSeconds', row[5]), 
                                                ('Latitude', row[6]), 
                                                ('Longitude', row[7]) 
                                            ]) 
            # Modified Latitude and Longitude 
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            ## For Latitude 
            latitude = str(required_data['Latitude']) 
            if '-' in latitude: 
                latitude = list(latitude) 
                latitude.insert(3, '.') 
            else: 
                latitude = list(latitude) 
                latitude.insert(2, '.') 
            required_data['Latitude'] = ''.join(latitude) 
 
            ## For Longitude 
            longitude = str(required_data['Longitude']) 
            if '-' in latitude: 
                longitude = list(longitude) 
                longitude.insert(4, '.') 
            else: 
                longitude = list(longitude) 
                longitude.insert(3, '.') 
            required_data['Longitude'] = ''.join(longitude) 
            rows_list.append(required_data) 
    # Return all rows for a CSV File 
    return rows_list 
 
if __name__ == '__main__': 
    SPMD = setupCollections() 
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    SPMD_one_day_collection = SPMD['OneDaySample'] 
    csv_files = get_files_list() 
 
    for csvfile in csv_files: 
        # print("[+] Attempting reading {}".format(csvfile)) 
        rows_list = csv_reader(csvfile) 
        for line in rows_list: 
 
            # Request directions via public transit 
            if SPMD_one_day_collection.find_one(line) is None: 
 
            # Look up an address with reverse geocoding 
                line['Address'] = reverseGeo(line['Latitude'], line['Longitude']) 
                post_id = SPMD_one_day_collection.insert_one(line).inserted_id 
                print(post_id) 
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<! DOCTYPE html> 
<html> 
  <head> 
    <meta charset="utf-8"> 
    <title>Geolocation map out with <code>setTimeout()</code></title> 
<! -- Defining the css values for button --> 
    <style> 
      html, body { 
        height: 100%; 
        margin: 0; 
        padding: 0; 
      } 
      #map { 
        height: 100%; 
      } 
      #floating-panel { 
        position: absolute; 
        top: 10px; 
        right: 5%; 
        z-index: 5; 
        background-color: #fff; 
        padding: 5px; 
        border: 1px solid #999; 
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        text-align: center; 
        font-family: 'Roboto','sans-serif'; 
        line-height: 30px; 
        padding-right: 10px; 
      } 
      #floating-panel { 
        margin-right: -52px; 
      } 
    </style> 
  </head> 
  <body> 
  <div id="floating-panel"> 
    <button id="drop" onclick="drop()">Drop Markers</button> 
  </div> 
  <div id="map"></div> 
  <script> 
<! -- Pass all Latitude and Longitude value into the latlong array --> 
    var latlong = [ 
    
    ]; 
    
    var markers = []; 
    var map; 
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<! -- Center postion of the map when initially loaded --> 
    function initMap() { 
   map = new google.maps.Map(document.getElementById('map'), { 
     zoom: 12, 
     center: {lat: 42.2976126, lng: -83.728420} 
   }); 
    } 
<! -- Start dropping LatLong values marks into the map with defined time --> 
    function drop() { 
   clearMarkers(); 
    
   for (var i = 0; i < latlong.length; i++) { 
     addMarkerWithTimeout(latlong[i], i * 200); 
   } 
    } 
<! -- Time defined to drop each and every value --> 
    function addMarkerWithTimeout(position, timeout) { 
   window.setTimeout(function() { 
     markers.push(new google.maps.Marker({ 
    position: position, 
    map: map, 
    animation: google.maps.Animation.DROP 
     })); 
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   }, timeout); 
    } 
<! -- Clearing the markers initially when map with center position is only loaded --> 
    function clearMarkers() { 
   for (var i = 0; i < markers.length; i++) { 
     markers[i].setMap(null); 
   } 
   markers = []; 
    } 
  </script> 
<! -- Using Google api with key to map the geolocation --> 
  <script async defer 
 
 src="https://maps.googleapis.com/maps/api/js?key=AIzaSyDIyIDCB_bCzjDoPR
YHoyY3wlUG7LZomoY&callback=initMap"> 
  </script> 
  </body> 
</html> 
Note: This code has been directly used from google and modified to utilize a specific 
Latitude and Longitude. [29] 
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Google Maps with plotted points 
Figure C.1: One Day Multi Vehicles (i.e. Overall 25000) -Zoomed out 
Figure C.2:  One Day Multi Vehicles (i.e. Overall 25000) - Zoomed in from figure 
C.1  
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Figure C.3:  One Day Multi Vehicles (i.e. Overall 25000) - Zoomed in from figure 
C.2 
Figure C.4:  One Day Multi Vehicles (i.e. Overall 25000) - Zoomed in Satellite view 
from figure C.3  
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One Day - Single Vehicle Sample 
Rx Device – 10116 
Figure D.1: One Day One Vehicle (Rx Device-10116) - Zoomed out 
Figure D.2: One Day One Vehicle (Rx Device-10116) - Zoomed in from figure D.1  
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Figure D.3: One Day One Vehicle (Rx Device-10116) - Zoomed in Satellite view from 
figure D.2 
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RxDevice – 10134 
Figure E.1: One Day One Vehicle (Rx Device-10134) - Zoomed out 
Figure E.2: One Day One Vehicle (Rx Device-10134) - Zoomed in from figure E.1  
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Figure E.3: One Day One Vehicle (Rx Device-10134) - Zoomed in Satellite view from 
figure E.2 
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RxDevice – 10145 
Figure F.1: One Day One Vehicle (Rx Device-10145) - Zoomed out 
Figure F.2: One Day One Vehicle (Rx Device-10145) - Zoomed in from figure F.1  
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Figure F.3: One Day One Vehicle (Rx Device-10145) - Zoomed in Satellite view from 
figure F.2 
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Multi Days - Single Vehicle Sample 
Rx Device – 10116 
Figure G.1: Multi Days One Vehicle (Rx Device-10116) - Zoomed out  
Figure G.2: Multi Days One Vehicle (Rx Device-10116) - Zoomed in from figure G.1  
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Figure G.3: Multi Days One Vehicle (Rx Device-10116) - Zoomed in Satellite view 
from figure G.2 
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RxDevice – 10134 
Figure H.1: Multi Days One Vehicle (Rx Device-10134) - Zoomed out  
 
Figure H.2: Multi Days One Vehicle (Rx Device-10134) - Zoomed in from figure H.1    
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Figure H.3: Multi Days One Vehicle (Rx Device-10134) - Zoomed in Satellite view 
from figure H.2 
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RxDevice – 10145 
Figure I.1: Multi Days One Vehicle (Rx Device-10145) - Zoomed out  
 
Figure I.2: Multi Days One Vehicle (Rx Device-10145) - Zoomed in from figure G.1    
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Figure I.3: Multi Days One Vehicle (Rx Device-10145) - Zoomed in Satellite view from 
figure I.2 
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To protect consumers from security 
and privacy threats to their motor  
 vehicles, and for 
other purposes. 
 
 
 
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
l l l l l l l l l l  
Mr. MARKEY  (for himself and Mr. 
BLUMENTHAL) introduced the following  
 bill;   which   was   read   twice   and   
referred   to   the   Committee   on 
l l l l l l l l l l  
 
A BILL 
To protect consumers from security and 
privacy threats to  
 their motor vehicles, and for 
other purposes. 
1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa- 
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2  tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Security and Privacy 
5  in Your Car Act of 2015’’ or the ‘‘SPY Car Act of 2015’’.  
6  SEC.  2.  CYBERSECURITY  STANDARDS  FOR  MOTOR  
VEHI- 
7 CLES. 
8 (a) IN  GENERAL.—Chapter 301 of title 49, United 
9 States Code, is amended— 
10 (1) in section 30102(a)— 
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1 (A)   by   redesignating   paragraphs (4) 
2 through (11) as paragraphs (10) through (17), 
3 respectively; 
4 (B)   by   redesignating   paragraphs (1) 
5 through (3) as paragraphs (4) through (6), re- 
6 spectively; 
7 (C) by inserting before paragraph (3), as 
8 redesignated, the following: 
9 ‘‘(1) ‘Administrator’ means the Administrator 
10 of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra- 
11 tion; 
12 ‘‘(2) ‘Commission’  means  the  Federal  Trade 
13 Commission; 
14 ‘‘(3) ‘critical software systems’ means software 
15 systems that can affect the driver’s control of the ve- 
16 hicle movement;’’; and 
17 (D) by inserting after paragraph (6), 
as 
18 redesignated, the following: 
19 ‘‘(7) ‘driving data’ include, but are not limited 
20 to, any electronic information collected about— 
21 ‘‘(A) a vehicle’s status, including, but not 
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22 limited to, its location or speed; and 
23 ‘‘(B)  any  owner,  lessee,  driver,  or  pas- 
24 senger of a vehicle; 
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1 ‘‘(8) ‘entry points’ include, but are not limited 
2 to, means by which— 
3 ‘‘(A) driving data may be accessed, directly 
4 or indirectly; or 
5 ‘‘(B) control signals may be sent or re- 
6 ceived either wirelessly or through wired con- 
7 nections; 
8 ‘‘(9) ‘hacking’ means the unauthorized access to 
9 electronic controls or driving data, either wirelessly 
10 or through wired connections;’’; and 
11 (2) by adding at the end the following: 
12 ‘‘§ 30129. Cybersecurity standards 
13 ‘‘(a) CYBERSECURITY STANDARDS.— 
14 ‘‘(1) REQUIREMENT.—All motor vehicles manu- 
15 factured for sale in the United States on or after the 
16 date that is 2 years after the date on which final 
17 regulations   are   prescribed   pursuant   to   section 
18 2(b)(2) of the SPY Car Act of 2015 shall comply 
19 with the cybersecurity standards set forth in para- 
20 graphs (2) through (4). 
21 ‘‘(2) PROTECTION AGAINST HACKING.— 
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22 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—All entry points to the 
23 electronic systems of each motor vehicle manu- 
24 factured for sale in the United States shall be 
 
 
 
 
 
77 
 
 
 
MDM15C25
 S
.L.C. 
4 
1 equipped with reasonable measures to protect 
2 against hacking attacks. 
3 ‘‘(B)  ISOLATION  MEASURES.—The  
meas- 
4 ures referred to in subparagraph (A) shall in- 
5 corporate isolation measures to separate critical 
6 software systems from noncritical software sys- 
7 tems. 
8 ‘‘(C)   EVALUATION.—The   measures   re- 
9 ferred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall be 
10 evaluated for security vulnerabilities following 
11 best  security  practices,  including  appropriate 
12 applications of techniques such as penetration 
13 testing. 
14 ‘‘(D)   ADJUSTMENT.—The   measures   re- 
15 ferred to in subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall be 
16 adjusted and updated based on the results of 
17 the evaluation described in subparagraph (C). 
18 ‘‘(3)   SECURITY   OF   COLLECTED   
INFORMA- 
19 TION.—All driving data collected by the electronic 
20 systems that are built into motor vehicles shall be 
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21 reasonably secured to prevent unauthorized access— 
22 ‘‘(A) while such data are stored onboard 
23 the vehicle; 
24 ‘‘(B) while such data are in transit from 
25 the vehicle to another location; and 
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1 ‘‘(C) in any subsequent offboard storage or 
2 use. 
3 ‘‘(4) DETECTION, REPORTING, AND  
RESPOND- 
4 ING TO HACKING.—Any motor vehicle that presents 
5 an entry point shall be equipped with capabilities to 
6 immediately  detect,  report,  and  stop  attempts  to 
7 intercept driving data or control the vehicle. 
8 ‘‘(b) PENALTIES.—A person that violates this section 
9  is liable to the United States 
Government for a civil pen- 
10 alty of not more than $5,000 for each 
violation in accord- 
11 ance with section 30165.’’. 
12 (b) RULEMAKING.— 
13 (1) IN  GENERAL.—Not later than 18 months 
14 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Ad- 
15 ministrator, after consultation with the Commission, 
16 shall  issue  a  Notice  of  Proposed  Rulemaking  to 
17 carry out section 30129 of title 49, United States 
18 Code, as added by subsection (a). 
19 (2)  FINAL  REGULATIONS.—Not  later  than 3 
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20 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
21 Administrator, after consultation with the Commis- 
22 sion, shall issue final regulations to carry out section 
23 30129 of title 49, United States Code, as added by 
24 subsection (a). 
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1 (3) UPDATES.—Not later than 3 years 
after 
2 final regulations are issued pursuant to paragraph 
3 (2) and not less frequently than once every 3 years 
4 thereafter, the Administrator, after consultation with 
5 the Commission, shall— 
6 (A) review the regulations issued pursuant 
7 to paragraph (2); and 
8 (B) update such regulations, as necessary. 
9 (c) CLERICAL  AMENDMENT.—The table of sections 
10 for chapter 301 of title 49, United States Code, is amend- 
11 ed by striking the item relating to section 30128 and in- 
12 serting the following: 
‘‘30128. Vehicle rollover prevention and crash mitigation. 
‘‘30129. Cybersecurity standards.’’. 
13 (d) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—
Section 
14 30165(a)(1) of title 49, United States Code, is amended 
15 by inserting ‘‘30129,’’ after ‘‘30127,’’. 
16 SEC. 3. CYBER DASHBOARD. 
17 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 32302 of title 49, United 
18 States Code, is amended by inserting after subsection (b) 
19 the following: 
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20 ‘‘(c) CYBER DASHBOARD.— 
21 ‘‘(1) IN  GENERAL.—All motor vehicles manu- 
22 factured for sale in the United States on or after the 
23 date that is 2 years after the date on which final 
24 regulations   are   prescribed   pursuant   to   section 
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1 3(b)(2) of the SPY Car Act of 2015 shall display a 
2 ‘cyber dashboard’, as a component of the label re- 
3 quired to be affixed to each motor vehicle under sec- 
4 tion 32908(b). 
5 ‘‘(2)   FEATURES.—The   cyber   dashboard   re- 
6 quired under paragraph (1) shall inform consumers, 
7 through an easy-to-understand, standardized graph- 
8 ic, about the extent to which the motor vehicle pro- 
9 tects the cybersecurity and privacy of motor vehicle 
10 owners, lessees, drivers, and passengers beyond the 
11 minimum requirements set forth in section 30129 of 
12 this title and in section 27 of the Federal Trade 
13 Commission Act.’’. 
14 (b) RULEMAKING.— 
15 (1) IN  GENERAL.—Not later than 18 months 
16 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Ad- 
17 ministrator, after consultation with the Commission, 
18 shall prescribe regulations for the cybersecurity and 
19 privacy information required to be displayed under 
20 section 32302(c) of title 49, United States Code, as 
21 added by subsection (a). 
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22 (2)  FINAL  REGULATIONS.—Not  later  than 3 
23 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
24 Administrator, after consultation with the Commis- 
25 sion, shall issue final regulations to carry out section 
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1 32302 of title 49, United States Code, as added by 
2 subsection (a). 
3 (3) UPDATES.—Not less frequently than once 
4 every 3 years, the Administrator, after consultation 
5 with the Commission, shall— 
6 (A) review the regulations issued pursuant 
7 to paragraph (2); and 
8 (B) update such regulations, as necessary. 
9 SEC. 4. PRIVACY STANDARDS FOR MOTOR VEHICLES. 
10 (a) IN  GENERAL.—The Federal Trade Commission 
11  Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.) is amended by inserting after 
12 section 26 (15 U.S.C. 57c-2) the following: 
13 ‘‘SEC. 27. PRIVACY STANDARDS FOR MOTOR 
VEHICLES. 
14 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—All motor vehicles manufactured 
15  for sale in the United States on or 
after the date that  
16 is 2 years after the date on which final 
regulations are  
17 prescribed pursuant to subsection (e) shall 
comply with  
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18 the features required under subsections 
(b) through (d). 
19 ‘‘(b) TRANSPARENCY.—Each motor vehicle shall pro- 
20  vide clear and conspicuous notice, in 
clear and plain lan- 
21 guage, to the owners or lessees of such 
vehicle of the col- 
22 lection, transmission, retention, and use 
of driving data 
23 collected from such motor vehicle. 
24 ‘‘(c) CONSUMER CONTROL.— 
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1 ‘‘(1) IN  GENERAL.—Subject to paragraphs (2) 
2 and (3), owners or lessees of motor vehicles shall be 
3 given the option of terminating the collection and re- 
4 tention of driving data. 
5 ‘‘(2)  ACCESS  TO  NAVIGATION  TOOLS.—
If  a 
6 motor vehicle owner or lessee decides to terminate 
7 the collection and retention of driving data under 
8 paragraph (1), the owner or lessee shall not lose ac- 
9 cess to navigation tools or other features or capabili- 
10 ties, to the extent technically possible. 
11 ‘‘(3)   EXCEPTION.—Paragraph (1)   shall   
not 
12 apply to driving data stored as part of the electronic 
13 data recorder system or other safety systems on- 
14 board the motor vehicle that are required for post- 
15 incident  investigations,  emissions  history  checks, 
16 crash avoidance or mitigation, or other regulatory 
17 compliance programs. 
18 ‘‘(d) LIMITATION ON USE OF PERSONAL DRIVING 
IN- 
19 FORMATION.— 
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20 ‘‘(1) IN  GENERAL.—A manufacturer (including 
21 an original equipment manufacturer) may not use 
22 any information collected by a motor vehicle for ad- 
23 vertising or marketing purposes without affirmative 
24 express consent by the owner or lessee. 
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1 ‘‘(2) REQUESTS.—Consent requests under para- 
2 graph (1)— 
3 ‘‘(A) shall be clear and conspicuous; 
4 ‘‘(B) shall be made in clear and plain lan- 
5 guage; and 
6 ‘‘(C) may not be a condition for the use of 
7 any   nonmarketing   feature,   capability,   or 
8 functionality of the motor vehicle. 
9 ‘‘(e)  ENFORCEMENT.—A  violation  of  this  section 
10 shall be treated as an unfair and deceptive act or practice 
11 in   violation   of   a   rule   prescribed   under   section 
12 18(a)(1)(B).’’. 
13 (b) RULEMAKING.— 
14 (1) IN  GENERAL.—Not later than 18 months 
15 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
16 Commission,  after  consultation  with  the  Adminis- 
17 trator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad- 
18 ministration (referred to in this subsection as the 
19 ‘‘Administrator’’), shall prescribe regulations, in ac- 
20 cordance with section 553 of title 5, United States 
21 Code, to carry out section 27 of the Federal Trade 
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22 Commission Act, as added by subsection (a). 
23 (2)  FINAL  REGULATIONS.—Not  later  than 3 
24 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 
25 Commission,  after  consultation  with  the  Adminis- 
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1 trator, shall issue final regulations, in accordance 
2 with section 553 of title 5, United States Code, to 
3 carry out section 27 of the Federal Trade Commis- 
4 sion Act, as added by subsection (a). 
5 (3) UPDATES.—Not less frequently than once 
6 every 3 years, the Commission, after consultation 
7 with the Administrator, shall— 
8 (A) review the regulations prescribed pur- 
9 suant to paragraph (2); and 
10 (B) update such regulations, as necessary. 
 
 
 
